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This paper presents empirical evidence against the popular perception that macro volatility is 
exogenous. We obtain tax effects on macro aggregates in the stochastic neoclassical model. 
Taxes are shown to affect the second moment of output growth rates without affecting the 
first moment. Exploiting heterogeneity patterns in a panel of OECD countries, we estimate 
tax effects on macro volatility, explicitly modeling the unobserved variance process. We find 
a strong empirical link between taxes and output volatility. Accounting for non-stationarity of 
taxes and output volatility, we find empirical evidence of a cointegrating relationship. 
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This paper presents empirical evidence against the popular perception that macro volatil-
ity is exogenous. Intuitively, the variance of output growth depends on the variance of
the shocks to productivity, the variance of factor input dynamics, such as hours worked or
capital, and their covariances. In dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models
(in the tradition of Kydland and Prescott 1982, Long and Plosser 1983), the variance of
the innovations to technology is considered to be exogenous.1 This paper shows that the
variance of factor dynamics is not exogenous, but explained by taxes.
Our empirical motivation stems from the fact that major US tax reforms took place
around the point in time where the break in output volatility is usually identied.2 In this
period, the focus of US policy debates was on the Economic Recovery Tax Act (ERTA),
the rst of the Reagan tax cuts (also known as Kemp-Roth Tax Cut) with large economic
eects (Auerbach and Slemrod 1997). Similarly, the moderation of output volatility in
the UK was accompanied by massive tax cuts (Giles and Johnson 1995).3 Eective tax
rates indeed show abrupt changes during the volatility slowdown for both the US and the
UK, and dier substantially across countries (Mendoza et al. 1994). Our objective is to
investigate whether there is a general link between taxes and output volatility.
Our work builds on Posch and W alde (2006), who obtain closed-form measures in
a model where macro volatility is fully endogenous and identify three channels through
which taxes can have eects on output volatility. This paper now thoroughly studies
the component which is present in any non-linear DSGE model and estimates the eects
empirically. For this objective we use a continuous-time formulation, which allows us to
derive tax eects on output growth volatility under Normal uncertainty.4 It turns out
that second-order approximation schemes are necessary in order to uncover tax eects
on output volatility in the discrete-time version (Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe 2004), which
makes any analytical attempt dicult.
The contribution of this paper is primarily empirical. One of its most surprising
ndings is the strong empirical link between tax rates and output volatility. Using a
panel of OECD countries from 1970 to 2004, our results demonstrate that the eects
of taxes are robust and of economic relevance. Together with other controls, eective
tax rates account for up to two thirds of the variation in output volatility. Conforming
with theoretical results, taxes on labor income and corporate income are statistically
1The stochastic shocks can be endogenous as in the growing through cycles literature (Bental and
Peled 1996, Matsuyama 1999, Francois and Lloyd-Ellis 2003, 2008, W alde 2005).
2The break for the US is often dated in 1984Q1 or 1984Q2 (Kim and Nelson 1999, McConnel and
Perez-Quiros 2000) while other estimates range from 1982Q4 to 1985Q3 (Stock and Watson 2002).
3Cecchetti et al. (2006) identify two breaks in 1981Q2 and 1991Q4 for the UK.
4An introduction to continuous-time DSGE models can be found in Turnovsky (2000).
1signicant and negatively correlated to output volatility, while the capital tax has the
opposite eect. For the consumption tax we do not nd statistically signicant eects.
These results are found to be robust to the employed estimation method and potential
non-normality of the residuals, i.e., using bootstrapped errors.
From a theoretical perspective, we show that in the stochastic neoclassical model
taxes aect the second moment rather than the rst moment of output growth rates. In
particular, we show that tax eects are not unidirectional specifying numerical results of
Greenwood and Human (1991). Using closed-form measures, we nd negative eects
from the income tax and the investment tax, whereas the tax on wealth amplies macro
volatility measured by the standard deviation of output growth rates. The consumption
tax has no eect. Output volatility can be decomposed into the variance of the exogenous
impulses and a component that is governed by fundamentals which reects the variance
factor input dynamics. Taxes aect the latter by distorting the consumption-savings
decision, which aects the variability of the capital rewards and nally translates into a
change in macro volatility.
We are aware of only one other paper that emphasizes changes in factor dynamics
and output volatility: the contribution of Stiroh (2009).5 His innovative paper takes a
production perspective and develops a \volatility accounting" methodology to quantify
the sources of volatility. One dierence between our papers is that our empirical approach
allows us to trace back changes in output volatility to changes in structural parameters
that an accounting framework cannot handle. Further, our theoretical model illustrates
the eects of taxes on factor dynamics, i.e., capital dynamics.
There is now a large literature on macro volatility. Much of it focuses on less developed
countries and nancial development (Denizer et al. 2002, Lensink and Scholtens 2004) or
institutions (Acemoglu et al. 2003). Our estimates conrm a robust link between output
volatility and variables including the mean output growth, the variability of real eective
exchange rates, measures of monetary policy and openness. Other controls are either not
found to be statistically signicant among OECD countries, such as variables based on
government expenditures, or not robust, such as nancial development.
This paper is closely related to studies investigating why output growth has become
less volatile in the US and in many other OECD countries (among others McConnel and
Perez-Quiros 2000, Stock and Watson 2002, 2005).6 From a demand perspective, the
literature emphasizes technological factors (e.g. inventory management) and improved
central bank policy (e.g. credible monetary policy, ination targeting). From a produc-
5Jaimovich and Siu (2009) establish the link between demographics and macro volatility.
6The paper of Stock and Watson (2002) surveys a substantial literature on the big moderation. Recent
work includes Cecchetti et al. (2006), Justiniano and Primiceri (2008), Canova (2009) and Stiroh (2009).
2tion perspective, however, changes in labor market dynamics are identied as potential
explanations (Stiroh 2009). We are unaware of any empirical studies linking output
volatility, or volatility of factor dynamics, to tax rates. Our nding that taxes should be
added to the potential explanations is new and complementary to the previous work.
In the paper we proceed as follows. Section 2 studies tax eects on output volatility
in a neoclassical model. Section 3 briey describes the estimation strategy and the
underlying measures. Section 4 presents the empirical results using various specications.
Section 5 provides a summary and concluding remarks.
2 Taxes and output volatility
This section provides a theoretical model for tax eects on output volatility. It focuses
on the propagation mechanism identied in Posch and W alde (2006). In its structure, it
describes a continuous-time real business cycle model with a government sector. For this
economy, we obtain a closed-form measure of output volatility based on growth rates.
2.1 The model
As the technological setup of the economy is standard, we keep the outline of the model
brief. The introduction of government activities and the implications for household be-
havior will be presented in more detail. Most of the derivations are in the appendix.






where L is total constant labor supply, Kt is the aggregate capital stock. Uncertainty
enters through an geometric process for total factor productivity, At, driven by a standard
Brownian motion Bt,
dAt = Atdt + AtdBt: (2)
Output Yt is used for producing consumption goods Ct and investment goods It. The
aggregate capital stock increases if gross investment It exceeds depreciation Kt,
dKt = (It   Kt)dt: (3)
Government. The government levies taxes on income, i, on wealth, a, on consump-
tion expenditures, c, and on investment expenditures, k. It cannot save or run debt and
uses all revenues to provide basic government services G,
Gt = i(Yt   Kt) + k(It   Kt) + cCt + a(1 + k)Kt  0: (4)
3We assume a myopic government simply providing basic government services without
interest in neither stabilization policy nor optimal taxation. The tax structure thus is
exogenously given to the model. Similarly, the absence of debt therefore is not relevant
because we want to illustrate the incentive eects of distortionary taxation on output
growth volatility of an elsewise frictionless economy. One could interpret the taxes as
wedges between competitive prices and observed prices (Chari et al. 2007). Additional
eects through the channel of scal debt are beyond the scope of this paper.
Preferences. The economy has a large number of representative households, who
maximize expected utility, given by the integral over utility, u = u(ct), resulting from










;  > 0: (5)
where instantaneous utility is characterized by constant relative risk aversion.













where wt denotes the real wage rate, and rt the rental rate of capital, both before tax.
Equilibrium properties. In equilibrium, factors are rewarded by wt = YL, and rt = YK
(value marginal product), respectively. Market clearing demands Yt = Ct + It + Gt, or








where we inserted the government budget constraint (4). Note that the quantities Ct and
It are after taxation. Since markets are perfectly competitive, the producer price of the








When consumption and investment goods are sold, they are taxed dierently such that
consumer prices are (1 + c)pC
t and (1 + k)pK
t , respectively. In order to rule out arbitrage
between dierent types of goods, we assume that a unit of production is useless for other
purposes once it is assigned for a specic purpose.
Solving the model requires the rst-order condition for consumption, the aggregate
capital accumulation constraint (3), the goods market equilibrium (7), and optimality
conditions of perfectly competitive rms. Thus we obtain a system of equations deter-
mining, given boundary conditions, the time paths of Ct, Kt, Yt, Gt, and wt and rt.
The traditional approach considers a stationary system and employs approximation
techniques to study the transitional dynamics. Recent research emphasizes higher-order
4approximation schemes (Schmitt-Groh e and Uribe 2004). In order to illustrate tax eects
on macro volatility, we use parametric restrictions under which the model has explicit so-
lutions. The main advantage is the availability of closed-form expressions for the densities
of macro aggregates and measures of output volatility.
2.2 Explicit solutions
Though our economy is set up in continuous time, we easily obtain discrete-time observed
output growth rates by integrating the stochastic dierential of log output using (1),


































It describes a controlled stochastic dierential equation (SDE) which, for solving, de-
mands more information about the behavior of households. In general equilibrium, their
decisions in turn determine the process for the capital stock and thus capital rewards.
Hence, the exogenous shocks enter output growth rates both contemporaneously and
inter-temporally because they are propagated through capital accumulation.
Theorem 2.1 If the output elasticity of capital equals the parameter of the utility func-
















Corollary 2.2 The rental rate of capital follows
drt = c1rt (c2   rt)dt + rtdBt; (11)
where c1  1 

1 i










The SDE in (11) is a geometric reverting diusion process, also known as the stochastic
Verhulst equation (Srensen 1991). Accordingly, c2 denes the non-stochastic steady state
to which rt tends, and c1 is the speed of reversion. It can be shown that rt has a limiting
Gamma distribution where all moments are available in closed form (Merton 1975).
7This parametric restriction is fairly well established in macroeconomics (Chang 1988, Xie 1991, 1994,
Boucekkine and Tamarit 2004, W alde 2005, Smith 2007).







 + (lnCt   lnCt ) + (Bt   Bt ): (12)
The result in (12) is remarkable as it implies a simple linear relation between output
and consumption growth rates, which clearly depends on the restriction  = .8 This
solution, however, neatly illustrates the propagation mechanism. As the bottom line,
households in general equilibrium aect the short-run dynamics of the output growth
rate by their consumption-saving decision. In what follows we show that (long-run) tax
eects on the volatility of growth rates operate exactly through this channel.
Intuitively, as from the standard Euler equation, the growth rate of consumption refers
to the capital rewards in (11). Indeed, in the proof to Corollary 2.3, we show that













It can be interpreted as the `discrete-time' version of the Euler equation for  = .
2.3 Tax eects in the stochastic neoclassical model
We are now interested in the tax eects on the output growth rate per unit of time.
Clearly as a standard result, taxation aects growth rates in the short run directly as
well as indirectly via capital accumulation, which has already been widely discussed in
the growth literature. In order to derive eects of taxation on other moments of the
distribution of growth rates, we study the long-run eects or the unconditional moments.








V ar(yt) = 
2V ar (lnCt   lnCt ) + 
2: (15)
Intuitively, we obtain these results for the following reasons. First, the mean does not
depend on taxes because it is only driven by the exogenous process in factor productivity.
Thus consumption and output must grow asymptotically at the same rate. Second, since
optimal consumption is a linear function of the capital stock, which is a deterministic
process, consumption growth rates and the Brownian motion increments are uncorrelated.
Unfortunately, the variance of consumption growth rate is complicated because it
refers to the variance of the integrated process of capital rewards in (13). Because of the
8The key mechanism is that consumption becomes linear in the capital stock, which determines capital
rewards in (11). Another solution with similar dynamics for capital rewards is provided in the appendix.
6Table 1: Tax eects in the stochstic neoclassical model
Marginal tax eects
i c k a
(income) (cons.) (investment) (wealth)
E(yt) 0 0 0 0












Notes: This table reports the marginal tax eects of time-invariant tax rates on volatility and growth in the neoclas-
sical model. The measures include the mean and variance of output growth per unit of time , neglecting third-order terms.
Table 2: Calibrated tax semi-elasticities and a plausible tax scenario for the UK
(a) Calibration (b) Tax semi-elasticities (c) Tax reform
i c k a
no taxes (income) (cons.) (investment) (wealth) baseline eect
E(yt) 0:0188 0 0 0 0 0:0188 0
V ar(yt) 0:0007  0:10% 0  0:10% +1:29% 0:0008  7:04%
E(rt) 0:1091 +0:32% 0 +0:31% +9:17% 0:2043  25:06%
V ar(rt) 0:0001 +1:33% 0 +1:32% +9:17% 0:0003  2:58%
Notes: This table illustrates tax eects on macro variables for technology parameters (;;;) = (:02;:75;:75;:075),
other parameters (;) = (:001;:025), and taxes (i;c;k;a) = (0;0;0;0). It shows (a) the implied mean and variance of
annual output growth rates, and the mean and variance of before-tax capital rewards, (b) percentage changes due to a one
percentage point increase in the tax rate, and (c) a tax scenario for the UK from the 1980s to the 1990s (cf. Figure 2). The
baseline calibration is (i;c;k;a) = (0:35;0:1;0;0:05) while the post-reform values are (i;c;k;a) = (0:5;0:1;0;0:005),
which encompasses a cut in the tax on wealth, a, and an increase in the income tax, i.
non-linear dynamics in (11), this variance is not explicitly available.9 Using closed-form
expansions, the variance of consumption growth is (see Appendix A.3)












Neglecting third-order terms and using  = , we obtain
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It shows that second-order approximations are necessary in order to capture tax eects
on macro volatility, which linearized versions would neglect. Table 2 illustrates that these
second-order eects indeed can be economically important.
9For a similar mean-reverting model of the spot rate dynamics, namely the Ornstein-Uhlenbeck
process, drt = c1(c2   rt)dt + c3dBt, the auto-covariance function and the measure is available in
closed form. For this linear model, V ar(
R t
t  rsds) is proportional to V ar(r)  limt!1 V ar0(rt), and
V ar(
R t
t  rsds)  V ar(r)2 coincides with the second-order Taylor approximation about  = 0.
7Economically speaking, a positive tax on wealth, a > 0, distorts the consumption-
saving decision. Incentives for capital accumulation will be lower since net capital returns
decrease similar to the eect of an increased depreciation rate. Individuals prefer more
consumption today instead of deferring it to the future. The non-stochastic steady state
value for capital rewards increases (eective capital stock decreases) as less resources are
used for capital accumulation. Because from (11) innovations to rt are proportionally
to the level of rt, it results into a higher variance of capital rewards. As this variance
contributes to the propagation component of output volatility, an increase in a nally
translates into higher output volatility in (17).
2.4 Taking the model to the data
After having studied the qualitative and quantitative eects, we now ask whether tax
eects on macro volatility can be established empirically. To this end, we use our explicit
solution for the growth rates to formalize our empirical strategy rewriting (12) as
yt  E(yt) + t: (18)
The residual variable is t  (   1
22) + (lnCt   lnCt )   E(yt) + (Bt   Bt ),
which has mean zero and tax-dependent variance. It simply denotes the deviation of the
actual growth rate from its long-run mean, capturing the transitional dynamics of the
neoclassical model. If capital rewards are above average (technically if the capital stock is
below its non-stochastic steady state), the growth rate is higher than the long-run mean.
From an econometric point of view, we can exploit the fact that t is a residual term
with zero mean and tax-dependent variance by explicitly modeling (and estimating) an
unobserved heteroscedasticity process dening i  E(yit) for country i as follows,
yit = i + it; where E(it) = 0; V ar(it) = hit;
hit = f(taxes):
Neglecting transitional dynamics in the growth equation, we can analyze the properties
of a model where the second rather than the rst moment depends on taxes.
3 Data and estimation strategy
Our approach to study output volatility patterns is to employ a panel of OECD countries
spanning the years 1970 to 2004. This provides the possibility of generating more accurate
predictions for individual observations than time series data alone. If the countries behave
similarly conditional on certain variables, as we would expect for incentives through tax
8Figure 1: Comparison of dierent observed volatility measures for key countries















































































































































Notes: These gures compare observed volatility measures for key countries starting in 1970. The rst measure results
from a xed-window (ve-years) approach gathering the period specic sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per capita,
while the second measure is based on ve-year rolling sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per capita.
rates, panel data provide the possibility of learning the behavior of a single country by
observing the behavior of other countries.
Data. In what follows we use measures of volatility and the eective tax burden at
the macro level. There seems to be consensus in the literature on the \great moderation"
that a useful measure of macro volatility is the standard deviation (sd) of output growth
rates. Our focus is on the sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per capita (APC).10
The reason for using data at annual frequency is the availability of tax measures.
In order to compute meaningful measures of output volatility, we need to collapse
several periods into one observation using xed windows or using rolling windows. While
the rst approach throws away information, the latter has quite complicated statistical
properties. Nonetheless both are useful for the purpose of illustration, robustness checks,
10Similar results based on quarter-to-quarter growth rates (QGR) on four-quarter rolling growth rates
(AGR), as well as on HP-ltered cyclical components (CY C) are provided in a separate appendix.
9Table 3: Linking theoretical tax rates to tax ratios
income tax, consumption investment tax on wealth,
i tax, c tax, k a
LABOR 
CAPITAL   
CORP 
CONS 
Notes: Based on Mendoza et al.'s (1994) denitions, LABOR denotes the labor income tax ratio, CAPITAL is the
capital tax ratio (including taxes on property), CORP is the corporate income tax ratio, CONS is the consumption tax
ratio. Taxes on investment goods are included only in the Carey and Rabesona (2004) tax ratio.
and are widely used in the profession. For the rst approach, we make use of two windows
(ve-years and ten-years), and gather the mean and the sd of variables starting in 1970.
In the latter approach, we use the ve-year rolling standard deviation of output growth
rates as in Blanchard and Simon (2001). Both measures clearly indicate that output
volatility diers substantially over time and across countries (cf. Figure 1).
To measure the average tax burden of a representative household on macro level we
choose the approach of Mendoza et al. (1994).11 Accordingly, we use four dierent types
of taxes, namely a tax measuring the tax induced cost of dependent labor (LABOR),
i.e., taxes on labor income, security charges and payroll taxes; a tax measuring the cost
of capital through taxation (CAPITAL), i.e., taxes on capital income, on the capital
stock as well as on capital transactions; an income tax of corporations (CORP); and
a consumption tax (CONS), i.e., taxes on goods and services and excise taxes. Most
notably, CAPITAL contains taxes on property, including recurrent taxes on immovable
property as well as taxes on nancial and capital transactions.12 This comprises the
inheritance tax which, given an innite horizon framework, could be interpreted as taxes
on wealth rather than taxes on income. To this end, the empirical tax ratios convey
the meaning of theoretical tax rates as summarized in Table 3. In that view, LABOR
and CORP are pure taxes on income, whereas CAPITAL measures the tax burden
associated with capital income, capital ows and the capital stock.
Figure 2 shows the time paths of tax ratios and ve-year sd of output growth rates
for major countries from 1970, illustrating the time dimension of our panel. Note that
abrupt changes of CAPITAL due to major tax reforms, which coincide with breaks in
output volatility in the 1980s and the 1990s, can be observed for the UK and the US,
11We also used modications of Carey and Rabesona (2004) for eective tax rates with similar results.
12Ideally the tax on the capital stock should be separated from the tax on capital income as eects
on volatility are dierent. However due to data availability we follow the common practice and allocate
these taxes to the cost of capital (CAPITAL).
10Figure 2: Tax ratios and observed volatility for key countries
























































































































Notes: These gures illustrate the time paths of tax ratios for capital (CAPITAL, solid), labor income (LABOR,
dashed), and consumption (CONS, dotted) together with the sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per capita (dot-
dashed) using the xed-window (ve-years) approach (cf. Figure 1, dot-dashed) for key countries (1970=1).
respectively. For illustration, the UK capital transfer tax (replaced by the inheritance tax
in 1986) was cut from 75 percent in 1984 to 40 percent in 1988 and accompanied by an
increase of the threshold from 25;000$ in 1980 to 200;000$ in 1995. As a matter of fact,
the contribution of property tax revenues to CAPITAL in the UK declined substantially
from 30.2 percentage points in 1981 to 13.8 percentage points in 1992. Similarly, there
is considerable heterogeneity in the cross-sectional dimension as reported in scatter plots
of output volatility versus tax rates (Appendix A.4, Figures A.1 and A.3), respectively.
Though some regularities in the data, no clear cut conclusion is drawn from the plots.
Other controls in volatility estimations include the mean per capita output growth
rate (GROW), the mean and sd of the ination rate (INFL, INFLSD), the mean and
sd of government consumption as a share of output (GGDP, GGDPSD), the degree of
openness measured by the ratio of exports plus imports to output (OPEN), the sd of
real eective exchange rates (XRSD), and the allocation of total credit to the private
11sector as percentage of GDP measuring nancial development (PRIV Y ).13
Estimation strategy. We are now prepared to address our empirical question: Con-
ditional on other controls, does output volatility vary systematically with tax rates? To
this end, we jointly estimate the parameters of the following system,
yit = i + it; where it  N(0;
2
it); (19a)
log(it) = i + t + 
0xit + 
0zit: (19b)
yit is the output per capita growth rate for country i = 1;:::;N and t = 1;:::;T,
expressed in log dierences, i is a country-specic mean and it denotes the sd of the
residuals it. Our primary focus is on the unobserved volatility process (19b) which models
log(it) as a linear function of country- and time-specic eects, i + t, as well as tax
rates, xit, and other controls, zit. This specication ensures that it is positive. Another
convenient property is that the parameters are interpreted as semi-elasticities.
Two caveats are important. First, our results are based on asymptotic properties,
hence the cross sectional dimension should be more important than the time-dimension.
For this reason, we do not account for dynamics in the mean equation but allow for a
country specic long-run mean. Second, we assume that the error terms are independently
distributed which again only holds asymptotically. Assuming that variables are close to
steady-state values and shocks are small, helps us to address both caveats. Moreover, we
check the robustness of our results by using dierent estimation strategies below.
Our system (19) is nested in an autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity (ARCH)
model. It extends the econometric approach in Ramey and Ramey (1995), allowing for
more exibility in the conditional variance equation by including additional controls and
time dummies. The parameter vector #  (;;;;;) is estimated jointly using
maximum likelihood (ML) treating the variances as parameters. It is straightforward to















Under sucient regularity conditions, the maximum likelihood estimator is consistent
and asymptotic normal. We employ this result to obtain asymptotic standard errors
based on the information matrix using the outer product estimate.
For a quick look at the data, we begin estimating the following econometric model,
log(it) = i + t + 
0xit + 
0zit + uit; (21)
13There is now a large literature on volatility estimation including Blanchard and Simon (2001), Denizer
et al. (2002), Lensink and Scholtens (2004), Cecchetti et al. (2006), and Jaimovich and Siu (2009).
12using observed volatility measures, it, denoting the sd of annual output growth rates per
capita in the xed window t = 1;:::;T, where T = 7 (ve-years) or T = 4 (ten-years), for
country i = 1;:::;N.14 Similar to (19b), log(it) is modeled as a function of country- and
time-specic eects, i+t, taxes, xit, other controls, zit, and an uncorrelated error term
with mean zero and equal variance, uit. Note that (21) emphasizes the cross-sectional
dimension relative to the time-dimension, and thus indeed is suitable for the study of
asymptotic properties in the data. This approach therefore is complementary to our
likelihood-based approach. We obtain the parameter estimates using the least square
dummy variable (LSDV) methodology. To avoid that results are driven by few outliers,
we also use iterated weighted least squares (IWLS) estimation.15
So far, we treated our variables as I(0). However, taxes and/or other controls may
be (locally) non-stationary. If taxes and output volatility are I(1), our results may be
either spurious or superconsistent. The latter is true for a cointegrating relationship. A
formal test of cointegration cannot be applied to unobserved variables. Nevertheless, to
strengthen our result of a long-run relationship between taxes and output volatility, we
extend our analysis to a dynamic approach, assuming variables to be at least I(1),
yit = i + it; where it  N(0;
2
it); (22a)
log(it) = i + t 1 + 
0xi;t 1 + 
0zi;t 1 + log(i;t 1); (22b)
for given country-specic initial conditions i;0. Obviously, the estimated parameters are
not directly comparable with the static approach (19b) as long as  6=  1. Note that this
approach closely follows the cointegration idea: Suppose taxes and output volatility are
not cointegrated. In order to balance the time series property that the left-hand side of
(22b) is stationary, neither ,  or  can be dierent from zero to obtain stationarity on the
right-hand side.16 Observe that the system (22) is nested in an generalized autoregressive
conditional heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model.
As a quick check, we estimate an error correction specication similar to (22b),
log(it) = i + t 1 + 
0xi;t 1 + 
0zi;t 1 + log(i;t 1) + vit; (23)
where it denotes the observed sd of annual output growth rates per capita in the ve-year
xed-window t for country i, and vit again is an uncorrelated error term with mean zero
14See Blanchard and Simon (2001) and Jaimovich and Siu (2009) for similar specications. One concern
in this specication is that the results might be spurious. As the time horizon using the xed-window
specication is very short, this is not as problematic as using rolling-windows.
15It is well known that the least squares estimator is particularly sensitive to small numbers of atypical
data points when the sample size is small or moderate. Using regression diagnostics for inuential data
points (leave-one-out deletion) suggests that a small number of observations have potentially large eects.
16We are not aware of research on cointegration within the conditional variance equation. According
to the standard cointegration principle, however, one should add an error term to equation (22b) as in
(23). This would lead to a stochastic volatility model which is an interesting path for future research.
13and equal variance. A formal investigation of no cointegration amounts to testing the
null hypothesis of the parameters in front of the controls to be zero (e.g., Banerjee 1999).
One caveat is the well known bias of the coecients in dynamic panels in the presence of
individual eects (Nickell 1981). Various techniques have been proposed in the literature.
Most approaches have important drawbacks as they may require additional decisions
regarding which and how many instruments to use or the performance may depend on
model-specic properties (see Bun and Carree 2005). We address this caveat by using
Bun and Carree's (2005) bias-correction for the LSDV estimator.
4 Empirical results
This section holds the estimation results. Following our estimation strategy, we use
observed volatility measures to get a general idea about eects present in the data. We
then fully exploit the panel structure by treating unobserved variances as parameters.
4.1 Observed variances
Static panel estimation. A quick answer to our empirical question is in Table 4, which
gives estimates for the semi-elasticities of various controls on observed output growth
volatility (percentage change of it given a percentage point increase of the control) for
our model in (21). It shows that output volatility indeed can be explained by various
fundamentals capturing roughly half of the variability of our volatility measure. Our key
parameter vector of interest is , which links our empirical tax ratios to volatility.
We nd quite robust empirical evidence for tax eects on output volatility in line with
our theoretical results (compare with Tables 2 and 3). The estimates in Table 4 show that
our results are similar for dierent estimators and window spans. To summarize, eects
of taxes on corporate income (CORP) and on labor income (LABOR) are statistically
signicant and negative. Holding constant other variables, an increase of LABOR by
one percentage point decreases output volatility by ve to eight percent. The capital tax
(CAPITAL) is positively related, and the consumption tax (CONS) has no clear eect.
Estimates of the other controls are in line with the literature. The estimated coecient
for mean growth (GROW) conrms a signicant and negative link with output volatil-
ity for the ten-year window. Measures of openness (OPEN), exchange rate volatility
(XRSD), government expenditures volatility (GGDPSD) and ination rate volatility
(INFLSD) are positively related. Somewhat controversial, we nd a negative eect of
the mean ination rate (INFL). Denizer et al. (2002) nd no statistically signicant
eect, while a positive link is found in Lensink and Scholtens (2004). The coecient for
government expenditures (GGDP) indicates an anti-cyclical policy but is insignicant in
14Table 4: Static panel estimation, observed volatility measures (xed-windows)
LSDV IWLS LSDV IWLS
OECD (ve-year) (ve-year) (ten-year) (ten-year)
LABORit 1  8:28 (2:03) ***  7:83 (1:83) ***  5:72 (1:92) **  5:43 (1:94) **
CAPITALit 2 6:24 (1:46) *** 5:01 (1:43) ** 5:54 (1:43) *** 4:55 (1:42) **
CONSit 3 5:89 (2:40) * 4:79 (2:74) .  0:41 (2:68)  0:48 (2:85)
CORPit 4  3:83 (0:90) ***  3:15 (0:92) ***  2:89 (1:08) **  2:28 (0:98) *
GROWit 1  8:18 (5:02)  7:37 (4:89)  29:77 (8:23) ***  21:30 (7:49) **
PRIV Yit 2  0:30 (0:40)  0:31 (0:41)  0:47 (0:34)  0:36 (0:41)
INFLit 3  5:70 (2:00) **  6:84 (2:05) ***  4:86 (2:36) *  3:71 (2:70)
INFLSDit 4 10:24 (3:83) ** 10:72 (3:35) ** 6:45 (2:78) * 5:93 (3:46) .
OPENit 5 2:61 (0:76) *** 2:43 (0:75) ** 1:73 (0:58) ** 1:21 (0:69) .
XRSDit 6 1:30 (2:08) 3:13 (1:90) . 2:90 (2:97) 3:61 (2:71)
GGDPit 7  2:46 (3:64)  1:45 (3:73)  5:09 (3:38)  2:59 (3:92)
GGDPSDit 8 48:84 (14:52) ** 39:33 (14:92) *  4:01 (11:33)  7:82 (11:30)
Degrees of freedom 85 85 38 38
Adjusted R-squared 0:43 0:48
F-statistic 3:53 2:95
Country xed eects i yes yes yes yes
Time xed eects t yes yes yes yes
Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1
Notes: This table reports the semi-elasticities of the xed-eects model (21) using the least square dummy variable
approach (LSDV) and iterated weighed least squares estimation (IWLS), explaining the sd of annual growth rates of
real GDP per capita. Standard errors of White's heteroscedasticity-consistent covariance matrix estimators (HCCME) in
the LSDV approach, and of R = 4999 model-based bootstrap replicates using the adjusted percentile method for IWLS
estimates are in parentheses.
the specications shown above. Similarly, the eect of nancial development (PRIV Y )
is not robust. Figures A.2 and A.4 plot taxes against estimated volatility, after removing
the eects of the other variables (cf. Appendix A.4).
Dynamic panel estimation. To avoid a spurious association, we check our results
estimating (23). Collecting terms gives the endogenous variable log(it) as a function of
its lagged value and other controls. As a result, we nd only a small bias. Table 5 gives
the estimate of  between  1:15 (0:11) and  1:32 (0:13) with biased corrected standard
deviation in parentheses. A formal test of no cointegration,  = 0, would be rejected
at any conventional signicance level. An important caveat is that a time dimension of
T = 6 is very short for residual-based tests of no cointegration (see Pedroni 2004). Our
bottom line is that tax eects remain statistically signicant in the dynamic specication
suggesting that our results are not spurious.
15Table 5: Dynamic panel estimation, observed variances (xed-windows)
LSDV-BC (i) LSDV-BC (ii) LSDV-BC (iii) LSDV-BC (iv)
OECD (ve-year) (ve-year) (ve-year) (ve-year)
LABORi;t 1 1  3:37 (2:24)  5:93 (3:35) .  8:24 (1:95) ***  7:44 (3:14) *
CAPITALi;t 1 2 5:78 (1:94) ** 7:40 (2:58) ** 6:41 (2:03) ** 8:42 (2:54) **
CONSi;t 1 3 1:66 (3:21) 2:00 (4:85) 0:22 (2:99) 5:14 (4:34)
CORPi;t 1 4  2:49 (1:30) .  2:94 (1:66) .  2:97 (1:37) *  3:55 (1:64) *
GROWi;t 1 1  3:04 (7:82) 11:08 (6:68)
PRIV Yi;t 1 2 0:20 (0:76) 0:22 (0:68)
INFLi;t 1 3 2:61 (3:25) 3:79 (3:01)
INFLSDi;t 1 4  3:23 (5:85)  1:28 (5:30)
OPENi;t 1 5 0:79 (1:54)  0:04 (1:30)
XRSDi;t 1 6  2:21 (3:08) 1:09 (2:98)
GGDPi;t 1 7 1:79 (6:25)  2:39 (5:57)
GGDPSDi;t 1 8 28:63 (24:62) 49:37 (23:74) *
i;t 1 1 +   0:15 (0:11)  0:21 (0:15)  0:23 (0:13) *  0:32 (0:13) *
Country xed eects i yes yes yes yes
Time xed eects t 1 yes yes no no
Degrees of freedom 89 68 94 73
Adjusted R-squared 0:26 0:19 0:11 0:13
F-statistic 2:43 1:67 1:63 1:51
Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1
Notes: This table reports the semi-elasticities of the dynamic model specication (23) using the least square dummy
variable approach (LSDV) with the proposed bias correction for dynamic panel models of Bun and Carree (2005), explaining
the sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per capita. Biased-corrected standard errors are in parentheses.
4.2 Treating variances as parameters
We further examine the relationship between output growth volatility and various control
variables including taxes by fully taking advantage of the panel structure of our data set.
Static panel estimation. We start estimating (19) without additional controls, then
we proceed using a similar specication as in Table 4. However, we need to change
the nature of the variables included in the zit vector as follows. To obtain volatility
measures of the ination rate, government expenditures, and the real eective exchange
rate, respectively, we follow Ramey and Ramey and use the innovations to country-specic
forecasting equations which include a constant, linear and quadratic time trends, and
specic controls. Instead of squared residuals we use absolute values. For the innovations
to the ination forecast (INFLFI) we make use of a Phillips curve based on measures of
aggregate activity (see Stock and Watson 1999). We use two lags of HP-ltered cyclical
component of real GDP per capita and two lags of the ination rate in addition to the
deterministic trends. Shocks to the forecast of government-spending growth (DGFI) are
based on two lags of log real GDP per capita and log government spending per capita;
16Table 6: Static panel estimation, treating variances as parameters
OECD MLE (i) MLE (ii) MLE (iii) MLE (iv)
LABORi;t 1 1  4:23 (1:52) **  4:76 (2:35) *  6:15 (1:18) ***  4:80 (1:87) *
CAPITALi;t 1 2 4:17 (1:29) ** 6:03 (1:92) ** 4:04 (1:21) *** 6:83 (1:79) ***
CONSi;t 1 3 2:25 (1:91) 3:31 (2:87) 0:41 (1:66) 2:80 (2:50)
CORPi;t 1 4  1:78 (0:65) **  2:54 (0:96) **  1:69 (0:61) **  2:74 (0:89) **
PRIV Yi;t 1 1 0:11 (0:55) 0:09 (0:44)
INFLi;t 1 2 3:14 (1:77) . 3:74 (1:53) *
INFLIi;t 1 3 9:21 (3:72) * 9:85 (3:68) **
GGDPi;t 1 4 0:89 (4:35)  1:36 (4:09)
DGFIi;t 1 5 0:02 (0:04) 0:02 (0:04)
XRFIi;t 1 6 2:58 (1:04) * 2:42 (0:97) *
Degrees of freedom 584 452 589 457
Log-likelihood 1605:6 1326:4 1594:0 1320:5
Country xed eects i yes yes yes yes
Time xed eects t yes yes no no
Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1
Notes: This table reports the semi-elasticities of the joint estimation of (19) using maximum likelihood, explaining the
conditional sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per capita. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
the forecast for the exchange rate (XRFI) is based on two autoregressive lags.17
Observing a break in volatility every year does not seem plausible. Nevertheless, there
seems to be consensus that breaks in volatility are observed over time. We allow for time-
specic breaks in the conditional variance using time dummies based on Stock and Watson
(2005), such that major breaks in volatility and other events occurring broadly across
countries are taken into account. Clearly, the assumption that these breaks occurred
at the same time for all countries is strong.18 It seems reasonable, however, to assume
that eects of important events spread over to other countries. Summarizing, we include
D = 5 time dummies, for the period until 1979 (through the breaks around 1980 in
the UK 1979:4-82:1 and Italy 1979:3-82:4), for 1980-83 (until the break around 1984 in
the US 1982:4-85:3), for 1984-86 (until the stock market crash in 1987), for 1987-1992
(ending with breaks around 1993 in Germany 1992:3-95:2 and Canada 1990:4-93:1), and
for 1993-2000 (new economy bubble burst).
To avoid endogeneity problems arising with contemporaneous explanatory variables,
we use one-period lagged values. Comparing the results in Table 6 with those obtained
from observed variances in Table 4, we nd striking similarities of tax eects on output
volatility, while using completely dierent estimation methods. Hence, taxes on labor
17We exclude OPEN which turned out to be insignicant and uninformative for the whole estimation
approach, while its eect seems to be fully captured by XRFI. Moreover, for technical reasons we have
to drop GROW as an explanatory variable. We refer to the growth-volatility link in the next section.
18Note that Stock and Watson (2005) only test for a single break date. Multiple break dates are e.g. in
Cecchetti et al. (2006) suggesting that our dummies capture breaks occurring broadly across countries.
17income (LABOR) and corporate income (CORP) decrease volatility, while the tax on
capital (CAPITAL) is associated with higher volatility. Even the order of magnitude
for tax rates is roughly comparable to that of initial estimates obtained before. For
example, a percentage point increase in CAPITAL increases output volatility roughly
by ve percent, which again is substantially higher than the theoretical semi-elasticities
just under one percent (cf. Table 2). As already mentioned, due to the narrow structure
of our neoclassical model without rigidities and with constant labor supply, this result
is not surprising. A more elaborate model is needed to match these empirical ndings.
Given our theoretical results, tax eects on labor supply and its variability would not
come as a surprise. Recent research traces the declining output volatility in the US,
e.g., to less volatile labor input (Stiroh 2009).19 Beside tax eects, other controls that
signicantly contribute to output volatility are innovations to the forecast of the real
eective exchange rate (XRFI), innovations to the ination forecast (INFLFI), and
the ination rate (INFL). Note that the latter result resolves the controversial negative
eect obtained by our initial estimates for INFL. A monetary authority focusing on a
stable and low ination rate removes output volatility, a result which is conrmed by the
forecasting equations: INFL signicantly increases INFLFI for most countries (see also
Ball 1992). Financial development is not statistically signicant. In contrast to Ramey
and Ramey, the innovations to government expenditures are not signicant.20
For illustration, Figure 3 shows the estimated volatility patterns for key countries.
Overall, the time paths and cross country patterns are captured by the model, with some
dierences in the explanatory power of control variables. While taxes account for most of
the variation in the UK and France (not shown), the time path for the other countries are
captured only after including additional control variables. The inclusion of time-specic
dummies improves the t, but does not change the overall pattern.
Dynamic panel estimation. When estimating (22) jointly, using the panel structure
of our data more eciently, we address the issue of a `cointegrating relationship'. Note
that our conclusions will not depend on time-xed eects which may account for the
non-stationarity to some extent. Conversely, especially for the case without time-specic
eects the estimated values should not be dierent from zero unless there was cointegra-
tion. To start with, we need pre-sample estimates for 2
it for t  0. As a natural choice,
we follow Bollerslev (1986) and use country-specic sample analogues 2
i;0 = T  1 P
t 2
it.
19Bilbiie et al. (2008) stress a negative correlation of output volatility and `asset market participation'.
As already mentioned, CAPITAL includes taxes on nancial and capital transaction, suggesting a
negative correlation: a lower tax may increase participation in asset markets with lower output volatility.
20Contemporaneous estimates suggest that INFL and GGDP signicantly contribute to output
volatility. We also experimented with the exclusion of GGDP and INFL as their lagged values are
included in the forecasting equations; however, this does not change the results.
18Figure 3: Static panel, observed vs. estimated volatility for key countries, model (ii)















































































































































Notes: These gures plot estimated conditional sd (solid) and observed ve-year rolling sd (dot-dashed) of annual growth
rates of real GDP per capita for key countries starting in 1970 (cf. Table 6, model (ii)).
Our estimated parameters are conrmative of a long-run relationship between taxes
and output volatility: the lagged endogenous parameter in the dynamic specication,
1 + , is virtually zero when including time-specic eects, which implies that the key
parameter  is estimated roughly  0:95 (0:09) with asymptotic standard errors in paren-
thesis (see Table 7). Without the additional time dummies, the estimated value of 
lies between 0:21   1 =  0:79 (0:07) and 0:31   1 =  0:69 (0:08) which is signicantly
dierent from zero. Other controls suggest only the measure of ination rate variability
(INFLFI) as a potential variable for a cointegrating relationship with output volatility.
To compare the order of magnitude to the static approach (see Table 6), we need to scale
the estimates for model (ii) and model (iv) by a factor of 1:3 and 1:5 as implied by (22b),
respectively, which gives similar point estimates for the semi-elasticities. For example,
the parameters linking output volatility and tax rates remain signicantly dierent from
zero for LABOR with an associated long-run semi-elasticity of  2:82=(1 0:21) =  3:6,
19Table 7: Dynamic panel estimation, treating variances as parameters
OECD MLE (i) MLE (ii) MLE (iii) MLE (iv)
LABORi;t 1 1  1:47 (2:17)  2:82 (1:34) *  2:78 (0:90) **  2:97 (1:05) **
CAPITALi;t 1 2 3:96 (2:00) * 4:72 (1:46) ** 2:33 (0:84) ** 2:10 (0:86) *
CONSi;t 1 3 4:82 (2:72) . 2:63 (1:76) 1:70 (1:12) 0:92 (0:84)
CORPi;t 1 4  1:46 (1:05)  2:06 (0:75) **  1:24 (0:51) *  1:25 (0:49) *
PRIV Yi;t 1 1 0:53 (0:50) 0:03 (0:28)
INFLi;t 1 2 0:90 (1:84) 1:85 (1:22)
INFLFIi;t 1 3 8:73 (3:86) * 9:97 (3:52) ** 10:43 (2:84) ***
GGDPi;t 1 4  3:99 (4:11)  3:26 (2:53)
DGFIi;t 1 5 0:02 (0:04) 0:05 (0:04) 0:05 (0:03)
XRFIi;t 1 6 1:95 (1:14) . 1:44 (1:07) 1:83 (0:98) .
i;t 1 1 +  0:05 (0:09) 0:21 (0:07) ** 0:26 (0:06) *** 0:31 (0:08) ***
Country xed eects i yes yes yes yes
Time xed eects t 1 yes no no no
Degrees of freedom 451 456 534 588
Log-likelihood 1337:8 1323:8 1496:1 1598:1
Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1
Notes: This table reports the semi-elasticities of the joint estimation of (19) using maximum likelihood, explaining the
conditional sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per capita. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
for CAPITAL with 4:72=(1   0:21) = 6:0, and for CORP with a semi-elasticity of
 2:6=(1   0:21) =  3:3 (referring to model (ii) of Table 7).
4.3 The link between volatility and growth
In a seminal paper, Ramey and Ramey (1995) study the link between volatility and
growth. Their basic econometric framework is nested in a generalized autoregressive
conditional heteroscedasticity-in-mean (GARCH-M) model. In general the GARCH-M
model has a drawback as no sucient conditions for consistency and asymptotic normality
are yet known. Following common practice, we assume that the maximum likelihood
estimator is consistent and asymptotic normal (see Nelson 1991).
To address the empirical link between volatility and growth, we jointly estimate the
following system using maximum likelihood (cf. Ramey and Ramey 1995, p.1141),
yit = i + it + it; where it  N(0;
2
it); (24a)
log(it) = i + t + 
0xit + 
0zit; (24b)
where yit is the output per capita growth rate for country i in year t, expressed as log
dierence; it is the sd of the residuals it; whereas i allows for country-specic eects
in the growth equation (24a), and i + t are country- and time-specic eects in the
20Table 8: Static panel estimation, the link between volatility and growth
OECD MLE (i) MLE (ii) MLE (iii) MLE (iv)
LABORi;t 1 1  1:34 (1:22)  3:8900 (1:20) **  3:96 (1:44) **
CAPITALi;t 1 2 3:33 (1:05) ** 3:6400 (1:07) *** 4:32 (1:20) ***
CONSi;t 1 3 1:40 (1:45)  0:1300 (1:42) 1:72 (1:81)
CORPi;t 1 4  1:43 (0:49) **  1:4800 (0:53) **  1:77 (0:58) **
PRIV Yi;t 1 1
INFLi;t 1 2 4:01 (1:00) ***
INFLIi;t 1 3 6:93 (2:26) ** 9:5000 (2:80) ***
GGDPi;t 1 4
DGFIi;t 1 5 0:05 (0:03) . 0:0700 (0:03) * 0:05 (0:03) . 0:09 (0:03) **
XRFIi;t 1 6 1:99 (0:67) ** 1:6500 (0:66) *
i;t   1:40 (0:30) ***  0:9700 (0:29) ***  0:69 (0:17) ***  0:85 (0:47) .
Degrees of freedom 528 534 549 566
Log-likelihood 1531:0 1501:3 1538:2 1514:5:7
Country xed eects i yes yes yes yes
Time xed eects t yes no yes no
Signif. codes: 0 `***' 0.001 `**' 0.01 `*' 0.05 `.' 0.1
Notes: This table reports the semi-elasticities of the joint estimation of (24) using maximum likelihood, explaining the
conditional sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per capita. Asymptotic standard errors are in parentheses.
variance equation (24b). Observe that compared to system (19), only the conditional
variance now appears as an additional control in the growth equation.
The results are shown in Table 8. Our estimates suggest that not only do our measures
remain signicant, volatility also has a negative partial correlation with growth. We
compare a specication similar to Ramey and Ramey using government-spending induced
volatility as a control variable (iv) to specications where we add tax rates (iii). Taxes
are remarkably signicant and the volatility-growth link becomes more precise. Further,
we add shocks from forecasting equations for the ination rate and the real eective
exchange rate (ii), and use a specication which includes all variables that have been
identied as potential control variables (i). Our results conrm a robust negative link
between volatility and growth. Accounting for more heterogeneity indeed strengthens the
negative link between volatility and growth among OECD countries.21
5 Conclusions
The aim of this paper is to shed light on the link between taxes and output volatility.
We start from a theoretical perspective demonstrating that distortional taxes aect the
21Note that the Levine-Renelt variables are fully captured by country-specic eects. Adding taxes or
time xed-eects in the growth equation (not shown) even increases the level of economic and statistical
signicance for tax rates in the conditional variance equation.
21variability of macro aggregates in the stochastic neoclassical model. Contrary to con-
ventional perceptions, we show that the second moment rather than the rst moment
of output growth rates is aected by taxes. In any non-linear DSGE model, individual
decisions have indirect inuence on macro volatility because they aect the variability of
capital rewards, which corresponds to the volatility of capital dynamics, through their
consumption-savings decision. In addition, the model is calibrated to obtain tax semi-
elasticities on output growth volatility.
Taking the model to the data, we make use of the heterogeneity of output volatility
and tax rates to estimate tax eects on macro volatility using panel estimation techniques.
Our study brings out some strong empirical regularities in output volatility among OECD
countries. Using several measures of volatility and estimation techniques we nd that
taxes are economically important and robust determinants, explaining dierences across
countries and over time. Accounting for non-stationarity of taxes and output volatility,
we nd empirical evidence for a cointegrating relationship.
In particular, and in accordance with our theoretical results, we nd that tax eects
are not unidirectional: while the labor and the corporate income tax are negatively
correlated, the capital tax is positively correlated with output volatility. Accounting
for potential outliers even strengthens the case for taxes. Indeed taxes are among the
robust determinants such as ination and eective exchange rate variability. In contrast,
nancial development was not found to be robust. We also conrm a strong empirical link
between volatility and growth (Ramey and Ramey 1995). Allowing for more heterogeneity
in the conditional variance equation indeed strengthens the observed empirical link.
References
Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, J. Robinson, and Y. Thaicharoen, \Institutional causes,
macroeconomic symptoms: Volatility, crises and growth," J. Monet. Econ., 2003,
50, 49{123.
A t-Sahalia, Yacine, \Closed-form likilihood expansions for multivariate diusions," An-
nals of Statistics, 2008, 36 (2), 906{937.
Auerbach, Alan J. and Joel Slemrod, \The Economic Eects of the Tax Reform Act of
1986," J. Econ. Lit., 1997, 35, 589{632.
Ball, Laurence, \Why does high ination raise ination uncertainty," J. Monet. Econ.,
1992, 29, 371{388.
22Banerjee, Anindya, \Panel data unit roots and cointegration: An overview," Oxford
Bull. Econ. Statist., 1999, pp. 607{629.
Bental, B. and D. Peled, \The accumulation of wealth and the cyclical generation of new
technologies: A search theoretic approach," Int. Econ. Rev., 1996, 37 (3), 687{718.
Bilbiie, F. O., A. Meier, and G. J. M uller, \What accounts for the changes in U.S. scal
policy transmission?," J. Money, Credit, Banking, 2008, 40 (7), 1439{1470.
Blanchard, Olivier and John Simon, \The long and large decline in U.S. output volatil-
ity.," Brookings Pap. Econ. Act., 2001, pp. 135{164.
Bollerslev, Tim, \Generalized autoregressive conditional heteroscedasticity," J. Econo-
metrics, 1986, 31, 307{327.
Boucekkine, Raouf and Ramon Ruiz Tamarit, \Imbalance eects in the Lucas model:
an analytical exploration," Topics in Macroecon., 2004, 4 (1), 1{17.
Bun, Maurice J.G. and Martin A. Carree, \Bias-Corrected Estimation in Dynamic Panel
Data Models," J. Bus. Econ. Statist., 2005, 23 (2), 200{210.
Canova, Fabio, \What explains the great moderation in the U.S.? A structural analysis,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2009, 7 (4), 697{721.
Carey, David and Josette Rabesona, Tax Ratios on Labor and Capital Income and on
Consumption, Cambridge, MA: in Peter Birch Srensen, Ed., Measuring the Tax
Burden on Capital and Labor, CESifo seminar series, 2004.
Cecchetti, Stephen G., Alfonso Flores-Lagunes, and Stefan Krause, \Assessing the
Sources of Changes in the Volatility of Real Growth," NBER, 2006, 11946.
Chang, Fwu-Ranq, \The Inverse Optimal Problem: A Dynamic Programming Ap-
proach," Econometrica, 1988, 56 (1), 147{172.
Chari, V. V., Patrick J. Kehoe, and Ellen R. McGrattan, \Business Cycle Accounting,"
Econometrica, 2007, 75 (3), 781{836.
Denizer, Cevdet, Murat Iyigun, and Ann L. Owen, \Finance and macroeconomic volatil-
ity," Contrib. to Macroecon., 2002, 2 (1).
Francois, Patrick and Huw Lloyd-Ellis, \Animal spirits trough creative destruction,"
Amer. Econ. Rev., 2003, 93 (3), 530{550.
23and , \Implementation Cycles, Investment, and Growth," Int. Econ. Rev.,
2008, 49 (3), 901{942.
Giles, Christopher and Paul Johnson, \Tax Reforms in the UK and Changes in the
Progressivity of the Tax System, 1985-95," Fisc. Stud., 1995, 15 (3), 64{86.
Greenwood, Jeremy and Gregory W. Human, \Tax Analysis in a Real-Business-Cycle
Model," J. Monet. Econ., 1991, 27, 167{190.
Jaimovich, Nir and Henry E. Siu, \The Young, the Old, and the Restless: Demographics
and Business Cycle Volatility," Amer. Econ. Rev., 2009, 99 (3), 804{826.
Justiniano, Alejandro and Giorgio E. Primiceri, \The time-varying volatility of macroe-
conomic uctuations," Amer. Econ. Rev., 2008, 98 (3), 604{641.
Kim, Chang-Jin and Charles R. Nelson, \Has the U.S. economy become more stable? A
Bayesian approach based on a Markov-Switching model of the business cycle," Rev.
Econ. Statist., 1999, 81 (4), 608{616.
Kydland, Finn E. and Edward C. Prescott, \Time to build and aggregate uctuations,"
Econometrica, 1982, 50 (6), 1345{1370.
Lensink, Robert and Bert Scholtens, \Financial development and the transmission of
monetary shocks," University of Groningen, Research Institute, 2004, (04E05).
Long, John B. Jr. and Charles I. Plosser, \Real Business Cycles," J. Polit. Economy,
1983, 91 (1), 39{69.
Matsuyama, Kiminori, \Growing through cycles," Econometrica, 1999, 67 (2), 335{347.
McConnel, Margaret and Gabriel Perez-Quiros, \Output uctuations in the U.S.: What
has changed since the early 1980's?," Amer. Econ. Rev., 2000, 90 (5), 1464{1476.
Mendoza, Enrique G., Assaf Razin, and Linda L. Tesar, \Eective tax rates in macroeco-
nomics: Cross-country estimates of tax rates on factor incomes and consumption,"
J. Monet. Econ., 1994, 34, 297{323.
Merton, Robert C., \An asymptotic theory of growth under uncertainty," Rev. Econ.
Stud., 1975, 42 (3), 375{393.
Nelson, Daniel B., \Conditional Heteroskedasticity in Asset Returns: A New Approach,"
Econometrica, 1991, 59 (2), 347{370.
24Nickell, Stephen, \Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Eects," Econometrica, 1981,
49 (6), 1417{1426.
Pedroni, Peter, \Panel cointegration: Asymptotic and nite sample properties of pooled
time series tests with an application to the PPP hypothesis," Econometric Theory,
2004, 20, 597{625.
Posch, Olaf, \Structural estimation of jump-diusion processes in macroeconomics," J.
Econometrics, 2009, forthcoming.
and Klaus W alde, \Natural volatility, welfare and taxation," CESifo, 2006, 1748.
Ramey, Gary and Valerie A. Ramey, \Cross-country evidence on the link between volatil-
ity and growth," Amer. Econ. Rev., 1995, 85 (5), 1138{1151.
Schmitt-Groh e, Stephanie and Martin Uribe, \Solving dynamic general equilibrium mod-
els using a second-order approximation to the policy function," J. Econ. Dynam.
Control, 2004, 28, 755{775.
Smith, William T., \Inspecting the Mechanism Exactly: A Closed-form solution to a
stochastic growth model," B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 2007, 7 (30), 1{31.
Srensen, Michael, Likelihood Methods for Diusions with Jumps, New York: in Prabhu
and Basawa, Eds., Statistical Inference in Stochastic Processes, Dekker, Inc., 1991.
Stiroh, Kevin J., \Volatility accounting: a production perspective on increased economic
stability," Journal of the European Economic Association, 2009, 7 (4), 671{696.
Stock, James H. and Mark W. Watson, \Forecasting ination," J. Monet. Econ., 1999,
44, 293{335.
and , \Has the Business Cycle Changed and Why?," NBER, 2002, w9127.
and , \Understanding Changes in International Business Cycle Dynamics,"
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2005, 3 (5), 968{1006.
Turnovsky, S. J., Methods of Macroeconomic Dynamics, Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT
Press, Second Edition, 2000.
W alde, Klaus, \Endogenous growth cycles," Int. Econ. Rev., 2005, 46 (3), 867{894.
Xie, Danyang, \Increasing returns and increasing rates of growth," J. Polit. Economy,
1991, 99 (2), 429{435.
25, \Divergence in Economic Performance: Transitional Dynamics with Multiple Equi-
libria," J. Econ. Theory, 1994, 63, 97{112.
A Appendix
A.1 The model
A.1.1 The household's budget constraint (6)
Nominal wealth is given by (1 + c)pC
t at = ktvt where kt is the individual's capital, vt is
the value of one unit of capital, and pC
t is the producer price of the consumption good.
For investment being positive, the price of an installed good equals the price of a new






Households receive net capital income (1 i)pY
t rtkt and net labor income (1 i)pY
t wt
(after-tax value marginal products), which is used for saving and consumption. Dene
savings pY
t st  (1   i)pY
t (rtkt + wt)   (1 + c)pC
t ct. A fraction
1 i
1+k + a of the capital













The relationship in (26) shows that a positive tax on wealth, a, simply increases the rate
of eective depreciation. We show below a also applies to real wealth, at, and not only












































where factor rewards are, wt = @Yt
@L  YL = (1   )Yt=L; and rt = @Yt
@Kt  YK = Yt=Kt:
A.1.2 The budget constraint of the government (4)
We start by summing up the budget constraint (6) using
PL














































































where we used Euler's theorem, that is Yt = YKKt + YLL in the last step. Finally, we
rewrite dKt=dt = It   Kt, multiply by (1 + k) and insert (1 + k)It from (7),
(1 + k)(It   Kt) = (1   i)(Yt   Kt)   a(1 + k)Kt   (1 + c)Ct
, Yt   Ct   It = k(It   Kt) + i (Yt   Kt) + a(1 + k)Kt + cCt  G:
A.1.3 The maximized Bellman equation
Dene the value of an optimal program of (5) as




which denotes the present discounted value of utility evaluated along the optimal program.
Following the same steps as in Posch (2009), the Bellman equation reads





















The rst-order condition reads
u
0(c0) = Va(a0;A0); (29)
making consumption a function of the state variables, c = c(a0;A0), and
















is the the maximized Bellman equation.
27A.2 Explicit solutions
A.2.1 Proof of Theorem 2.1
The idea of this proof is to show that together with an educated guess of the value
function, both the maximized Bellman equation (30) and rst-order condition (29) are











Kt , Lct = Lat , ct = at: (32)
Using (29) together with (5), and (32), we obtain Va = (at) . Moreover, our guess in




















where we dened g(At)  f(At) fAAt  1
2fAAA2
t2. Inserting factor rewards together
with Kt  Lkt = 1+c





























































  (1   );
which we nally can solve for  in (10).
A.2.2 The evolution of capital rewards
Using It^ o's formula (change of variables), capital rewards, rt = AtK
 1
t L1 , follow
drt = rAdAt + rKdKt = rtdt + rtdBt + rK(It   Kt)dt;
Now inserting rK =  (1   )rt=Kt, and replacing Yt=Kt = rt=, we obtain with (9)
drt = rtdt + rtdBt   (1   )(It=Kt   )rtdt;
=













rtdt + rtdBt: (33)
28A.2.3 Proof of Corollary 2.2
Inserting Ct =
1+k
1+cKt in the evolution of capital rewards (33), we obtain
drt =








   a   

rtdt + rtdBt:



















































Using the denitions c1 and c2 we nally obtain (11).
A.2.4 Proof of Corollary 2.3




















Insert the policy function C =
1+k
















dt + dBt: (34)
It denotes an ane SDE which solution is given by simple integration
yt = yt0 + (t   t0)














rsds + (Bt   B0);
where rt is known explicitly (cf. Posch 2009). Moreover, using the production function
(1), log output is yt = lnAt+lnKt+(1 )lnL. Now insert the solution Ct =
1+k
1+cKt
from Theorem 2.1 and dene yt  yt   yt , to obtain
(lnCt   lnCt ) = yt   (lnAt   lnAt ) (35)
Inserting the solutions to the SDEs in (2), lnAt  lnAt  = (  1
22)+(Bt  Bt ),
we obtain (12). Inserting the solution for log output (34) for t0 = t    we obtain
(lnCt   lnCt ) =



































which for  =  is (13).
29A.2.5 An alternative solution
The proofs for Theorem A.1, Corollaries A.2 and A.3 are analogous to Appendices A.2.1
to A.2.4 and available in a separate appendix on request from the author.























Corollary A.2 The (before tax) rental rate of capital follows
drt = c3r(c4   rt)dt + rtdBt (37)
where c3  1 

1 i
1+k, and c4  
1 
1+k


























rsds + (Bt   Bt ): (38)
A.2.6 Moments of capital rewards
Consider the process in (11) or (37). Merton (1975) showed that rt has a limiting Gamma
distribution. Thus all moments exist and are known. Alternatively, we may use the
following approach which is based on SDEs. Because lnrt is a smooth transformation of
rt, the sequence flnrtg1
t=t0 converges in distribution to a random variable lnr,
lnrt !
D lnr where   1 < lnrt < 1: (39)
Compute the stochastic dierential dlnrt = c1(c2   rt)dt   1
22dt + dBt. Because it
describes a smooth transformation of rt, it has a unique limiting distribution. If we apply
























which is the asymptotic mean, i.e., the mean of the limiting distribution.





























The variance of the limiting distribution is V ar(r) = E(r2)   E(r)2 = E(r)1
22=c1.
A.3 Volatility and taxation
A.3.1 A stochastic balanced growth property
Lemma A.4 Given the restriction  = , Cov (lnCt   lnCt ;Bt   Bt ) = 0.
Proof. Inserting Ct =
1+k
1+cKt from Theorem 2.1, we have to show that








which holds because from (3) dlnKt = (It=Kt   )dt is instantaneously deterministic.








 +  lim
t!1


































using (40) in the last step. Plugging the result back into (41), we obtain the unconditional
mean of output growth rates in (14). Observe that consumption and output asymptoti-
cally grow at the same exogenous rate, which is the stochastic equivalent to the balanced
growth property in the standard neoclassical model.
A.3.2 Moments of integrated capital rewards
For the variance of output growth rates, we use (12) and Lemma A.4 to obtain (17),
which shows it is given by the variance of consumption growth rates and the variance of
the shocks. To compute the variance of consumption growth rates, we start from (13),
lim
t!1


































Therefore, to compute the variance of the integrated process, we need joint moments
E(rsru). Consider s > u, then E(rsru) = E(ruE(rsjru)). We use the deterministic Taylor













The function g() is suciently dierentiable. As a result, we obtain a closed-form ex-
pansion of the conditional expectation around ru. Using g(x) = x, we obtain
Ax = c1x(c2   x); A
2x = c
2






Using a second-order Taylor expansion (44), the conditional expectation reads
























Hence, we obtain for the joint moments







































































Plugging the result back into (42) gives the variance of consumption growth in (16).
Finally, neglecting third-order terms, and inserting the asymptotic variance of capital
rewards as from Appendix A.2.6, gives our measure in (17).22
22The author thanks to Michael Srensen for helpful discussions on this issue.
32A.4 Empirical results
A.4.1 Simple and partial correlation of taxes and output volatility
Figure A.1: Simple correlation of taxes and observed volatility (ve-year xed-windows)
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Notes: These gures give scatter plots of observed volatility measured as the sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per
capita against tax rates using the xed-window (ve-year) panel approach.
33Figure A.2: Partial correlation of taxes and observed volatility (ve-year xed-windows)
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1
Notes: These gures give scatter plots of observed volatility measured as the sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per
capita against tax rates using the xed-window (ve-year) panel approach controlling for other eects (cf. Table 4, rst
column).
34Figure A.3: Simple correlation of taxes and observed volatility (ten-year xed-windows)
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Notes: These gures give scatter plots of observed volatility measured as the sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per
capita against tax rates using the xed-window (ten-year) panel approach.
35Figure A.4: Partial correlation of taxes and observed volatility (ten-year xed-windows)
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1
Notes: These gures give scatter plots of observed volatility measured as the sd of annual growth rates of real GDP per
capita against tax rates using the xed-window (ten-year) panel approach controlling for other eects (cf. Table 4, third
column).
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